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1. Introduction1 
The literature on trade and the environment has proceeded largely along two paths.  One 
strand of the literature has examined the impact of trade itself on pollution (see Copeland and 
Taylor; 1994, 2003).  It has highlighted the fact that by fostering economic growth, trade can 
have two opposing effects on environmental quality.  On the one hand, the higher output 
resulting from trade would contribute to pollution (the “scale” effect).2  On the other hand, 
higher income would result in greater demand for a cleaner environment and might, therefore, 
result in the adoption of pollution-reducing technologies (the “technique” effect).3,4  A second 
strand of the literature has modeled strategic interactions between two trading partners.  An 
important conclusion drawn by this line of inquiry is that, contrary to popular wisdom, it might 
not be optimal for a government to impose weak environmental standards on domestic industries 
to give them a competitive advantage.  Strict standards might instead be optimal if firms compete 
in prices (Barrett, 1994). 5  
A policy issue that has been central to environmental policy in the United States, among 
other nations, relates to biofuels.  The use of crops such as corn to make substances like 
bioethanol has several implications, including reduced reliance on oil imports from potentially 
unreliable trade partners and a moving to cleaner sources of energy.  While our analysis can be 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 If, however, pollution quotas are enforced through the issuance of a fixed number of pollution permits, the 
environmental impact of trade liberalization might be negligible.  Further, it can be shown that if pollution taxes are 
adjusted to equate the marginal cost of pollution with the marginal benefits of the associated production, the net 
impact on pollution is indeterminate (Lopez, 1994; Rauscher, 1997; Copeland and Taylor, 2003).  
3 Empirical evidence suggests that the effects of rising income might be the stronger driver of the trade-environment 
relationship, resulting in a positive impact of trade on environment in higher-income countries (Frankel and Rose, 
2005). 
4 See Antweiler et al. (2001). 
5 A related issue is trade in hazardous substances, which can have a direct negative impact on the environment of the 
importing nation.  A recent paper by Baggs (2009) provides an empirical analysis of this issue, where the focus is on 
country characteristics that determine trade in hazardous materials.  Also, see Dean (1992), for a survey of issues 
that pertain to such trade.     
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adapted to address the first issue, in line with the trade and environment literature we choose to 
focus on the second.     
This is an important issue given the longstanding government support for biofuels and the 
dramatically increased diversion of the US corn crop into ethanol production (Figure 1).  In 1980, 
about one-half of a percent of US  corn production was used to produce ethanol, but by 2009 this 
share was 33 percent, having risen more than five-fold between 2000 and 2009.  More recently, 
on October 13, 2010, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) raised the 30-year-old cap 
of 10 percent ethanol blend in fuel for ordinary cars to 15 percent (known as E15) for models 
2007 onward (Power, 2010, and Wald, 2010).  The implementation of this new rule has 
coincided with rising corn prices and severe drought, which highlights how the effects of biofuel 
policy do not occur in a vacuum.  One of the central contributions of this paper is to provide a 
general equilibrium model that helps us to analyze such linkages, which, in turn, helps to 
enlighten policy. 
The use of biofuels cannot be discussed in isolation from two related issues.  First, it is 
generally accepted that the growth of the biofuel industry in all countries except Brazil, where it 
has attained scale economies, is contingent on significant subsidy.6 Second, given the energy 
inefficiency of biofuels, an aggressive strategy to promote its use can lead to a significant 
increase in the world prices of food items.7  Among other problems, this second issue can be 
                                                 
6 In the United States, where bioethanol production is corn based, the break-even price for petroleum is $54 per 
barrel, and in Europe, where bioethanol production is wheat based, the break-even price is $72 per barrel (Larson, 
2008).  The US government provides a subsidy of 51 cents per gallon to producers of bioethanol.  In Germany, 
where the growth of the production and use of biofuels was among the fastest in EU member countries, biofuel 
producers not only enjoy a 35 percent tax advantage vis-a-vis the producers of traditional fuels, but the state also 
subsidizes construction of biofuel production units up to 50 percent.  
7 For example, corn-based ethanol has 57 percent energy efficiency while petroleum has 81 percent efficiency. 
OECD (2006) estimates suggest that, to account for 10 percent of vehicular fuel, 60-70 percent of the current crop 
area in the US, Canada, and the EU-15 countries would have to be devoted to crops that can be used to produce 
ethanol. 
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quite devastating for the developing nations.8  Developed countries would be affected also if, as 
projected, there is a steep increase in the prices of staple items like corn and wheat.  Such 
projections clearly warrant a discussion about the efficacy of opting for biofuel subsidies.9 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a benchmark to think about biofuel subsidies 
within the context of international trade and pollution, where trade policies cannot be used due to 
conflicts with WTO rules.  Pollution is treated here as a global public good because fossil fuels 
contribute (arguably) to atmospheric change.  To simplify the analysis we treat a homogeneous 
food item like corn to have two potential uses.  The first is direct consumption as food.  The 
second is to use as an intermediate input in the production of energy.  The other intermediate 
input used to produce energy is crude oil.  Energy itself is treated as a non-traded commodity 
because of difficulties in shipping it across large distances.  The focus of the analysis is on two 
nations, one of which (say US) exports corn, while the other (say China or Brazil) imports corn 
in exchange for manufacturing exports.  The supply of crude comes from a third nation (say the 
Middle East), which is blackboxed here through the assumption that the price of crude is fixed.10  
                                                 
8 Runge and Senauer (2007) have argued that by pushing up the price of crops that are staples for the world’s poor 
population, by 2025 biofuels could nearly double the number of people who are chronically hungry. 
9 By contrast, the discussion in the trade and environment literature largely involves policies that either cap pollution 
through fiat and permits or raise the cost of producing the polluting good (see Copeland and Taylor, 2004, for a 
discussion). 
10 This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably.  For example, even in a simple model like Bhagwati et al. 
(1983) where there are two goods (and hence a single relative price) and free trade, the introduction of a third, non-
participant, nation can generate price amplification and transfer paradoxes that do not arise in two-country models.  
Our model, although not terribly complicated, has an additional traded intermediate input (hence, two relative prices 
to be potentially determined by the world market), a non-traded good, and several policy variables.  Endogenizing 
the price of crude in even our simple structure would add  several layers of complexity.  Given that the point of our 
paper is to consider how biofuel policies affect food prices, and not to analyze fossil fuel prices, our assumption is a 
tractable compromise.  Of course, one can always look at the effects of fossil fuel price changes in our model by 
conducting comparative static exercises.  The outline of such an analysis is presented in section C of the appendix at 
the end of this paper, for the case of Laissez Faire.  Finally, we refer the reader to an important paper by Lapan and 
Moschini (2009) which does analyze multiple relative prices.  They use some functional separability assumptions  
and quasi-linearity to achieve tractability, although their general equilibrium sectoral structure is quite different from 
ours.     
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Consequently, the terms-of-trade that we consider is between food and manufacturing, where the 
latter is treated as the numeraire good. 
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the use of crude in energy production is 
polluting, while the use of corn in making energy is not.11  The analysis proceeds in three parts.  
In the first, we consider a small open economy facing given prices of all the traded goods.  The 
only market failure here stems from the pollution externality created by crude use in energy 
production, which can be corrected by an appropriate tax on crude.  If the tax on crude is not 
available because of political economy considerations, the second-best policy may be a tax rather 
than a subsidy on biofuel.  This result complements and extends the findings of Vedenov and 
Wetzstein (2008) and Khanna et al. (2008), who have also noted this possibility in other contexts.  
We discuss the differences between our analysis and their respective papers in the next section. 12  
At this point, it is also worthwhile to note that the wisdom of biofuel subsidization has also been 
questioned by Grafton et al. (2010).  Using a dynamic model, they show that biofuel subsidies 
may increase the rate of fossil-fuel extraction, and thereby make potential climate-change 
damages more imminent.   
The second part of this paper deals with the case where the terms-of-trade for food is 
endogenous to the system.  In this context, we consider welfare-maximizing crude tax and 
biofuel subsidy combination for the food-exporting nation (the other nation is assumed to be 
passive).  The tax on crude departs from the Pigouvian level, because in addition to targeting 
pollution it also affects the terms-of-trade of food by raising the demand for corn to be used as a 
substitute for crude in energy production.  In addition, a biofuel subsidy is also used to 
                                                 
11 This assumption keeps the analysis clean without sacrificing the basic thrust of our results as long as crude use is 
assumed to be more polluting than biofuel use.  The point of this paper is not to justify bioethanol policies, but to 
suggest that even if they are clean, they can still be misused compared to first or second-best benchmarks.  Of course, 
if they are more polluting than crude, then our arguments about possible misallocations caused by such policies are 
strengthened. 
12 Also see de Gorter and Just (2010) in this context.  
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complement the terms-of-trade improving impact of the crude tax.13  Effectively, in a world 
where beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies cannot be used because of WTO rules, a tax on crude 
and a biofuel subsidy may serve a similar purpose.         
When the food exporting nation uses biofuel subsidy to improve its terms of trade, the 
food importing nation suffers.  However, the food importing nation can also use its biofuel 
subsidy to counter this adverse terms-of-trade movement.  This strategic interdependence of 
biofuel policy has not yet been analyzed in this literature.  Our paper is the first to cast this 
problem in the context of a Johnson (1953) type Nash policy equilibrium, which is augmented to 
consider pollution as a global public good.  Instead of using imports tariffs or export taxes, the 
nations use biofuel subsidies to target both pollution and terms-of-trade.  When a subsidy is 
warranted by the pollution motive, the terms-of-trade motive complements it for the food 
exporter.  In contrast, for the food importer, the terms-of trade motive pulls the biofuel subsidy 
below the level suggested by the pollution motive.  
        
2. The Benchmark Case: A Small Open Economy 
Let us consider a small open economy with representative consumers.  Each consumer 
maximizes utility given by ( , , , )U U F E M G    , where F , E , M , and G are consumption levels 
                                                 
13 Lasco and Khanna (2009) analyze terms-of-trade effects of biofuel subsidies.  However, their context is one of an 
ethanol importing nation, where a biofuel subsidy leads to a terms-of-trade loss.  Of course, in such a setting there is 
no incentive to subsidize biofuels purely for terms-of-trade reasons.  In contrast, we want to highlight the gain of US 
corn farmers from a higher price of corn in the world market.  Hence terms-of-trade gain is an integral motive of 
biofuel subsidization in this paper.  Lapan and Moschini (2009) also analyze biofuel subsidies in a trade model.  
While this paper complements their analysis, we have some important differences.  First, the functional separability 
assumptions in their paper seal off many of the intersectoral linkages that we consider.  Second, the fuel tax that they 
consider is a tax that discourages use of both fossil fuel and ethanol (i.e., it is imposed on the blend).  Thus, a rise in 
their fuel tax will reduce the demand for ethanol.  In contrast, the burden of our fossil fuel tax falls exclusively on 
the use of fossil fuel as an input in energy production.  This causes substitution toward biofuel (as an input in 
energy), and raises the demand for biofuel/corn.  In turn, this confers terms-of-trade benefits to the food exporting 
nation.  Finally, a major difference between our models is that we consider a three nation context, where two nations 
import crude from a third nation, and both of these nations engage in biofuel policy.  The strategic interdependence 
in biofuel policy that arises in this context is novel to the literature and complements the aforementioned papers.   
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of food, energy, a manufactured good, and clean environment, respectively.  M is the numeraire 
good.  If p is the price of food and q is the price of energy, the expenditure function is 
),,1,,( Guqpe   Min ,~~~ MEqFp  subject to ( , , , )u U F E M G    ,   (1) 
which yields the usual Hicksian demand functions.  In addition, 0ue 14 and 0 GuG Uee .15    
In this economy, all commodities are produced using constant returns to scale (CRS).   
Food (F) is produced using labor ( FL ) and land (T ).  Assuming that land is specific to food and 
that its endowment is given, we have 
( , ) ( ),F FF F L T f L   where (.) 0f    and (.) 0f   .      (2) 
Competitive profit maximization ensures that (.)'pfw  , implying that ( , )F FL L p w .   
Similarly, the manufactured good is produced using labor ( ML ) and energy ( ME ): 
( , )M MM M L E .          (3) 
The profit maximization conditions are ),( MML ELMw  and ),( MME ELMq  .  Labor supply 
is given at L , such that 
           F ML L L  .16          (4) 
Finally, energy is produced using food for biofuel (B) and crude oil (R)—our proxy for fossil 
fuel.17  All of R is assumed to be imported at a given price r: 
                                                 
14 Throughout the paper we use the convention that unless specified otherwise, i and ij  are, respectively, the first- 
and second-order partial derivatives of any function ( , ) i jx x .   
15 Consider quasi-linear preferences and separability of G: ( , ) ( )U F E M G      .  The expenditure function 
associated with this utility function is:  ( , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ), ( , )] Ge p q u G pF p q qE p q u F p q E p q         , which 
implies ( , )pe F p q  , ( , )Eqe p q  , 1ue  , ( ) 0Ge G    , and 0pu que e  . 
16 The production structure in this model is somewhat similar to Marjit et al. (2007), in that a policy induced wage 
rise in the manufacturing sector must have a negative effect on the landowners in the agricultural sector, who own 
an immobile fixed factor.    
17 Biofuel B in our model is just corn used as an intermediate input for production of energy E.  The sum of B and 
the consumption demand for corn (food) is the total demand for corn in this economy.  Thus, corn can either be an 
exportable or an importable in the small open economy case, depending on the underlying production and 
consumption parameters that define this economy.  In the large country case analyzed later, we assume that the third 
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)R,B(EE  .          (5) 
The function ),( RBE is a standard production function in the inputs B and R, with diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution, such that one can imperfectly substitute B for R along a given 
energy isoquant.  We should note that R is not directly consumed—it is a pure intermediate input 
in producing energy.  Thus, there is no direct relationship between R and B in consumption.  
However, energy and food are both consumed, and our expenditure function allows for 
substitutability or complementarity.  Thus, although there is no direct relationship between B and 
R on the consumption side, their effects on food or energy prices will lead to cross-effects 
between food and energy consumption.  Finally, we note that the profit-maximization conditions 
in the energy sector equate the net input prices of B and R to the values of their marginal 
products.   
 The environment here is treated as a global public good, where carbon emissions lead to 
global pollution.  Carbon emissions occur at the energy production stage, and, consistent with a 
view of biofuel as being cleaner, we assume that crude is polluting but that biofuel is not.18  Let 
*R be the amount of crude used in the foreign nation.  Clean environment is a decreasing 
function of the amount of global crude use, such that  
  *G G R R  ,  . 0G  . (6a) 
Further, noting that in the small country case the amount of crude used by the rest of the world 
( *R ) is taken as given by the domestic nation, (6a) reduces to 
                                                                                                                                                             
country neither produces nor consumes corn.  Thus, the first two nations (Home and Foreign) have to balance the 
world market for corn.  Without loss of generality, we have assumed there that corn is an exportable for the home 
country and, thus, an importable for the foreign country.   
18 An alternative would be to propose that global pollution is a function of biofuel and crude, with biofuel being 
relatively less polluting.  Our polar assumption considerably simplifies the analysis without compromising the basic 
messages that can be drawn from it.      
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  G G R , ( ) 0G R  .  (6b)  
The expenditure-revenue identity for this economy (equivalently, its trade balance equation) is 
.),(),()(),,1,,( MMMF qErRpBRBqEELMLpfGuqpe          (7) 
Given the difficulties in trading energy in its final form over long distances, we assume that E is 
a nontraded good with its price determined by the zero profit condition: 
 ( , ,1)q C p r ,          (8) 
where (.)C  is the unit cost of producing energy.  The assumption of CRS implies that 
0 rRpBqE .  Substituting this expression in (7) and using (8), total differentiation of (7) 
yields 
0G
u
e Gdu
dR e
   .         (9) 
It is clear from Eq. (9) that the competitive Laissez Faire equilibrium is not socially optimal in 
the sense that a small reduction in R will raise the utility of the representative agent of this small 
open economy.  This is the standard market failure outcome where energy producers do not have 
to pay for the costs of pollution that they create.  The next sections explore the different policy 
options available to correct this distortion.      
 
2.1  Optimal Subsidy on Biofuel and an Optimal Tax on Crude 
 Suppose that the government subsidizes the use of biofuel (B) such that its input price in 
energy production, net of subsidy s, is spps  .  Also, assume that the government uses a tax t 
on crude, so the domestic price of crude is trrd  .19  Using (8), 
                                                 
19 Given the production function described in Eq.(5), where we assume a diminishing marginal rate of substitution 
between the two inputs, a rise in either t or s will raise B and reduce R through the substitution effect, although the 
effect on output effects will differ.  From (10) it is evident that the subsidy will reduce the price of energy, while the 
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 ( , ,1) ( , ), ,  and s d s t
B Rq C p r q q s t q q
E E
      .     (10) 
Under CRS, tRsBrRpBqE  .  Using (7) and (10) we get  
  u Ge du sdB t e G dR    ,         (11) 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the loss due to the distortion in input use, and the 
second term is the net benefit due to the reduction of crude use.  From (11), the optimal subsidy 
condition is 
0u
ue
s
   ( )
opt s
G
s
Rs t e G
B
  .20         (12) 
Using (12),  
( ) 0 0opts tu G t G
s
R Bue t e G R t e G
t B
            
, assuming .0
s
ts
t B
BRR  (13) 
Notice that Ge Gmeasures the amount of the numeraire good that the consumer will need to be 
compensated for a unit rise in R (and hence pollution).  Therefore, using (12) and (13), it is clear 
that the optimal crude tax is the Pigouvian tax, which equals the marginal damage from pollution.  
Also, when this tax is in place, the optimal biofuel subsidy is zero.  In this small open economy, 
the only source of market failure is the environmental externality of crude production.  An 
appropriate tax is enough to rectify this failure, and no other instrument is necessary.  This is a 
useful benchmark for the analysis and results below, where we extend the model to consider 
                                                                                                                                                             
crude tax will raise the energy price.  As the crude tax raises the price of energy, the quantity of energy demanded 
will fall, reducing the scale of production.  This output effect may or may not offset the rise in biofuel demand 
because of the substitution effect.  However, demand for crude will surely fall.  By analogous reasoning, the biofuel 
subsidy will surely raise the use of biofuel, but may or may not raise crude use.  This issue is analyzed in detail in 
section 2.2, where equations (19) through (22) provide the relevant mathematical proofs.    
20 Part B of the appendix derives sR , tR , sB , and tB  for both the small- and the large-country cases using a quasi-
linear utility function that is also separable in G.  This provides a tractable example, and there is no loss in generality.  
Indeed, the analysis in the text is for general utility functions.  Details of derivations for the general case, which 
allows for income effects, are available from the authors on request.   
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situations where either a tax is not available as an instrument or other externalities exist (such as 
a terms-of-trade externality) that the tax instrument cannot address fully.     
   
2.2  Second-Best Biofuel Subsidy (when a crude tax is not feasible) 
 A tax on crude might not be available as a policy instrument, perhaps because of the 
country’s political economy.21  On the other hand, the presence of a strong agricultural lobby can 
make biofuels attract policy attention.  Consider ethanol produced from corn, which is mixed 
with crude to make the final fuel.  Although the efficiency of making corn-based ethanol is 
questionable, it is quite popular in the United States because it is good for the corn belt states like 
Iowa and Minnesota and draws support from both the agricultural and ethanol producing 
lobbies.22  The analysis below describes the biofuel subsidy as a second-best instrument. 
  Using 0t   in (11),  
0u
ue
s
  
SB s
G
s
Rs e G
B
  ,        (14) 
where SBs  is the second-best biofuel subsidy.  Note that 
(.) (.) (.) .sr r rpR C E dR C dE EC ds           (15) 
Also, total energy use must equal the amount used as an input in the manufacturing sector plus 
the amount used directly in consumption: 
                                                 
21 While section 2.2 considers the polar case where a tax on crude is not allowed, it is not difficult to adapt it to cases 
where such taxes are allowed but political compulsions limit their level.  In such a case, the tax may be restricted to 
not exceed a level maxt , such that max Gt t e G  .  Using Eq. (11) it is clear that in such a case a biofuel subsidy 
is potentially welfare improving.  The case analyzed here is one where max 0t  , and it facilitates exposition, 
without sacrificing anything critical.  Furthermore, the paper does conduct a careful analysis of the crude tax in 
sections 2.1 and 3.1.  Although we do not pursue an explicit political economy analysis in this paper, it is possible to 
do so along the lines of Fredriksson (1997) and others.  
22 See, for example, Power (2010), which states “The cause of boosting ethanol use in cars has been strongly 
championed by Growth Energy, an ethanol trade group led by Wesley Clark, the retired army general and 2004 
Democratic presidential candidate.”   
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 , ( ),1, , ( ) ( , )MqE e p q s u G R E p q  23  Mqq q qu qGdE e E dq e du e G dR     . (16) 
Using (15) and (16), 
   sMqq q s qG qurpdE e E q EC e G ds e du       , where,  1 1 .r qGC G e    (17) 
Using (10), note that when 0t  , )(sqq   and .0 EBqs  Using this fact, along with (15) 
and (17), we have  
  ,YdudsZAqdR s                  (18) 
where ( ) 0Mqq q rA e E C   , 0srpZ EC   , and qu rY e C .24,25  At the utility-maximizing 
,s  0du   and 
   .s sR Aq Z                                                                                                                 (19) 
 Following a similar set of steps as above, we can compute the impact on food demand of 
a biofuel subsidy: 
  ,duYdsZqAdB FFsF                  (20) 
where ( ) 0sF Mqq qpA C e E   , ( ) 0s s s sF qGrp p p pZ E C e G C C     ,26 and spquF CeY  .  Once 
again, at the utility-maximizing subsidy rate, 0du   and  
0.F Fs sB A q Z                    (21) 
Using (19) and (21) in (14) (i.e., after taking into account the impact of the subsidy on the use of 
crude and the demand for biofuel for energy production), the second-best subsidy is 
                                                 
23 The zero profit condition in manufacturing is ( , ,1) 1 M MC w q p .  This implies that ( )w w q and that 
( ) M ME w q L .   Using (2) and (4),  , ( ) ( , ) M M ML L p w q L p q .  Thus, ( , )M ME E p q . 
24 It can be shown that A < 0 if  < 0, which is the case when  GququGqG UeeUe   is small. 
25 Note that in the two-input case, concavity of the cost function requires that the cross effect is strictly positive. 
26 We assume here that the environment-generated income effect on energy demand (i.e., eqG ) is sufficiently small, 
such that the own-price effect s sp pC  dominates. 
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0SB sG F F
s
Aq Zs e G
A q Z
    iff 0s sAq Z R   .     (22) 
 
Proposition 1:  In the absence of a tax on crude, the second-best policy is to subsidize the use of 
biofuel if and only if the cross input substitution effect in energy production overcomes the 
subsidy’s scale effect via a reduction in the price of energy.     
 
The term sAq captures the scale effect of the subsidy on crude demand, while Z  is the 
cross-substitution effect between the two inputs in energy production.  The latter effect is easy to 
understand.  The biofuel subsidy reduces the relative price of biofuel, thereby providing an 
incentive to substitute biofuel for crude in the production of energy.  Its magnitude depends on 
the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.  Consider now the scale effect.  The subsidy 
reduces the net input price of biofuel.  This is passed on as a reduction in energy price, which 
stimulates the aggregate demand for energy, which in turn raises production (the scale effect).  
The net impact of these two effects is ex ante ambiguous and is determined by demand-side 
parameters and the aforementioned elasticity of substitution.  If technology is Leontief type, for 
example, the cross-substitution effect will disappear altogether.  In such a case, the demand for 
crude would unambiguously increase with a subsidy, and a government that aims to improve 
environmental quality should tax biofuel rather than subsidize it.   
It is important to note that both Vedenov and Wetzstein (2008) and Khanna et al. (2008) 
find similar results.  The model analyzed by Vedenov and Wetzstein (2008) is analogous to our 
special case where technology is of the Leontief type.  This is because their equation (3 ) fixes 
the ratio in which ethanol must be used with fossil fuel to cater to aggregate fuel consumption, 
which rules out substitution between ethanol and fossil fuel.  In contrast, the primary role of the 
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biofuel subsidy in our model is to reduce the relative price of using corn as an input in energy 
production, which makes the role of input substitutability central to our analysis.  Khanna et al. 
(2008) is closer to our modeling.  First, they acknowledge the role of input substitutability 
through a CES production function for energy, where the inputs are gasoline and ethanol.  Then 
they show that an ethanol subsidy may raise or reduce emissions, because the substitution toward 
ethanol may be offset by the increase in miles driven because of the price reducing effect of 
input subsidization.  There are important differences between our analyses.  First, we consider 
use of energy not only for consumption but also as an input in the manufacturing sector.  This 
amplifies the scale effect, because cheaper energy not only spurs consumer demand but also 
makes industries more energy intensive (this shows up as the term MqE in Eq. (16) and in the 
analysis following it).  Another difference is an explicit recognition of the feedback 
income/pollution effects of subsidization.  For example, the second term on the right-hand-side 
of Eq. (16) accounts for changes in the demand for energy from direct income changes (given 
pollution), while the third term relates to pollution induced change in demand (for a given u). 
Finally, at the heart of our analysis is the dual use of corn as input into energy production and as 
final consumption good (i.e., food).  This allocation is affected when the biofuel subsidy affects 
the price of food.  While proposition 1 is derived under the assumption of a constant food price 
(small open economy assumption), this assumption is relaxed starting from the next section.  In 
such a context, a rise in corn prices due to a greater demand for corn will move the relative price 
of food against domestic consumers.  The resulting substitution in consumer demand toward 
energy will further amplify the harmful scale effect of the subsidy.  These are all distinct insights 
that complement the existing literature.   
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3. The Large-Country Case 
The small-country assumption retained up to this point requires that the price for food 
(i.e., p) is given exogenously by the world market.  An important issue regarding biofuel 
subsidies is that they encourage alternate uses of food products, thus reducing the net availability 
of food and raising its price in the global market.  This issue can be modeled in the context of a 
large open economy where the food price is endogenous.  If the subsidy raises the net global 
demand for food, its international price will rise, conferring terms-of-trade gains to the food-
exporting nation.  In addition, following the logic of the previous sections, such a subsidy will 
also affect pollution.   
 Suppose that there are three nations: home, foreign, and the rest of the world (ROW).    
The home country exports food to the foreign country and imports a manufactured good from it.  
It also imports crude from the ROW at a given terms-of-trade r and pays in terms of the 
manufactured good (the numeraire).  Thus, the home trade balance requires that the value of its 
food exports must equal the value of its net imports of the manufactured good.  The latter equals 
the sum of home consumption of the manufactured good and its payment to the ROW for crude, 
net of home production of the manufactured good.  Analogously, the foreign country’s net export 
of the manufactured good equals its production minus the sum of its consumption demand and 
payment to the ROW (for crude).  Finally, the ROW is assumed to not have any domestic 
consumption of crude, and its only role in the model is to provide crude to the home and foreign 
countries in exchange for the manufactured good.27  Home and foreign trade balance conditions 
are, respectively, 
MrRMpX  ~  and ,~ **** MrRMpX        (23)  
                                                 
27 This structure lends tractability to the model.  Admittedly, allowing for price of crude to be endogenous and for 
the ROW to consume crude are realistic assumptions, but they come at the cost of complicating an already-complex 
analysis.  The central points that we make are intuitive and can be made without adding to the model’s complexity.  
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where BefX p   and **** BefX p   are their net exports of food.28 
 
3.1  Optimal Policy: The One-Sided Case 
 This subsection considers optimal policy choice for the home nation, where the foreign 
nation is passive (i.e., when * * 0s t  ).  In the presence of a home tax t on crude and a subsidy 
s on biofuel, the home expenditure-revenue relationship is 
.),(),()(),,1,,( MMMF qErRpBRBqEELMLpfGuqpe     (24)  
Noting that in the large-country case *R is endogenous, (6) has to be replaced by *( )G G R R  .  
We differentiate (24) to get  
*( ) .u G Ge du Xdp sdB t e G dR e G dR            (25)  
Equation (25) is similar to (11) in the small open-economy case, with two important differences.  
The first is the terms-of-trade effect, which is captured by the first term on the right-hand-side of 
(25).  Home’s utility will rise to the tune of a rise in the price of food (i.e., dp ) weighted by its 
level of food export (i.e., X).  The second critical difference (compared with the small-country 
case) is that when the home country affects p, it affects the foreign country’s net input price of 
biofuel as well.  In turn, this changes *R , and hence G .  Given that the foreign government is 
assumed to be passive,  
* * * * W
u Ge du X dp e G dR  and *RRRW  ,      (26) 
where WR is global crude use.29  The market-clearing equation for food is 
,0****  XXBeBeff pp        (27) 
                                                 
28 Note that production and consumption structure in both nations are the same as in section 2.  The notation is 
similar, except that an asterisk refers to the foreign country. 
29 We relax this passivity assumption in the next subsection, where both nations may use biofuel subsidies.   
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which implies that 
),( tspp  .30           (28) 
Using (25) and (28), the optimal subsidy and tax levels are 
 * *( )s G s t G t t sopt
s t s t
Xp e G R R e G R Xp R
s
B R R B
     ,  0s t s tB R R B  ;    (29a) 
. *opt
opt t G t t
G
t
B s e G R Xpt e G
R
   .       (29b) 
 
Proposition 2:  A large open-economy’s optimal tax on crude will depart from the standard 
Pigouvian tax of the small open-economy case.31  Also, even if an optimal tax on crude is in 
place, the optimal biofuel subsidy may be nonzero.   
 
  It is clear from an inspection of (29a) and (29b) that even if an optimal crude tax is in 
place, a biofuel subsidy is still required.  Consider for expositional purposes the case where SR is 
zero and sp is positive.  In this case, assuming that sB  is positive,
32 the optimal subsidy is 
positive if and only if the term sXp  is larger than 
*
G se G R .  The term sXp  is the standard terms-
of trade effect, while *G se G R is home’s utility loss from increased crude use (and pollution) by 
the foreign country, induced by a rise in the price of food (and hence the price of biofuel) due to 
home’s subsidization.  These two effects are novel to the large-country case and explain why the 
                                                 
30 The terms-of-trade effects are analyzed by using a quasi-linear utility function that is also separable in G .  This 
serves as a tractable example and does not compromise the generality of our results. 
31 Lapan and Moschini (2009, discussed earlier) also show that a tax on fuel will depart from its Pigouvian level.  
However, the role that their fuel tax plays is quite different.  Their tax improves the nation’s terms-of-trade in crude 
imports, and discourages both ethanol and fossil fuel use.  In contrast, we assume a fixed fossil fuel terms-of-trade, 
while our tax encourages substitution towards biofuel (as an input into energy), and raises the demand for 
biofuel/corn, conferring terms-of-trade benefits in terms of food exports. 
32 In the appendix we show that while sB is necessarily positive in the small-country case, there is some ambiguity 
in the current context. 
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optimal biofuel subsidy here departs from the zero level of the small-country case discussed 
earlier.  In the small-country case, the only role of the biofuel subsidy is to target the domestic 
crude level ( R ).  When an optimal crude tax is in place, there is no reason to use the subsidy.  
This is not true in the large-country case.  Even if the effect of a biofuel subsidy on domestic 
crude use is zero (i.e., if 0sR  ), there are still gains from using a biofuel subsidy.    
 Turning to the optimal tax on crude, it is clear from (29b) that the expression for the 
optimal tax here is different from Ge G  (which was the optimal tax level in the small-country 
case).  The expression differs because the tax here has three additional effects.  First, it affects 
the use of biofuel and therefore the burden of the subsidy to the extent .opttB s .  Second, by 
changing p, the price of crude relative to the net input price of *B is affected in the foreign nation.  
If this leads to an increase in foreign crude use (i.e., if * 0tR  ), then home utility is reduced.  
Finally, if the tax raises the price of food (i.e., if 0tp  ), then the home nation gains to the tune 
of tXp .
33   
3.2  Nash Biofuel Subsidies 
 Here we consider a scenario in which a crude tax is unavailable as a policy instrument, 
although home and foreign can both use biofuel subsidies.34  Each nation’s subsidy affects the 
net global demand for food and, hence the common international price of food.  Therefore, each 
                                                 
33 The expression for pt is in the appendix.  Suffice it to note here that a tax affects the net global demand for food 
through various channels, including the substitution of biofuel for crude in energy production when crude becomes 
more expensive.  This effect by itself will tend to raise demand and the price of food, but there are countervailing 
effects.  For example, the tax raises the input price for energy production, in turn raising the energy price.  This will 
tend to reduce energy demand, which will reduce the derived demand for biofuel.  For details, we refer the reader to 
the appendix. 
34 This assumption lends tractability and allows us to focus better on the role of interdependence between nations in 
their choice of biofuel subsidies.  This is a relatively small sacrifice to make, because the fundamental insights of 
using a crude tax and biofuel subsidy combination have already been discussed.          
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country’s biofuel subsidy affects the other’s utility, raising strategic considerations for both 
nations.  We assume that the nations play Nash in the sense that each takes the other’s subsidy 
rate as given when choosing its own utility-maximizing subsidy.  The market-clearing equation 
(27) yields 
),( *sspp  .          (30) 
Using (24) and (30), 
.Wu s s s G se u Xp sB e G R           (31) 
Assuming 0sB  (see the appendix for details), the Nash utility maximizing subsidy is 
 0
W
Nash s G s
s
Xp e G Rs
B
  , iff Ws G sXp e G R .      (32a) 
Analogously, we can derive the foreign subsidy rule.  In addition, using *X X  , we get 
* *
* * *
*
*
0
W
Nash s G s
s
X p e G Rs
B
  , iff ** *Ws G sXp e G R        (32b) 
The details of the terms-of-trade effects ( sp  and *sp ) are analyzed in the appendix.  
Suffice it to say here that one of the primary effects of a biofuel subsidy is to encourage the use 
of biofuel instead of crude.  This increases the demand for food (as biofuel) and raises its price 
regardless of which country is providing the subsidy.  Thus, both sp and *sp  are likely to be 
positive.  On the other hand, there is an asymmetry in the terms-of-trade effect on the utility of 
the two nations, because while home is an exporter of food (i.e., X > 0), foreign is an importer 
(i.e., * 0X X   ).  First, consider the case where WsR is negative.  Home subsidization reduces 
global pollution, and this benefit, coupled with the terms-of-trade gain, suggests that the Nash 
subsidy in (32a) is positive.  On the other hand, if the scale effect makes WsR  positive, the terms-
of-trade motive and the pollution-reduction motive conflict and a subsidy might or might not be 
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justified.  Using (32b) we can see that analogous considerations suggest that the foreign country, 
which suffers from a terms-of-trade loss when it uses a biofuel subsidy, will subsidize only if its 
subsidy reduces pollution (i.e., only if * 0WsR  ).  The foreign country will choose a subsidy if the 
aforementioned necessary condition is met, and if the pollution-reduction effect dominates the 
adverse terms-of-trade effect that the foreign nation imposes on itself. 
 It is easy to see from the discussion above that terms-of-trade considerations might lead 
the home country to choose a biofuel subsidy even when it increases pollution, and conversely, 
the foreign country may choose a tax even when its subsidy reduces pollution.  It is obvious that 
such an equilibrium is jointly suboptimal: the terms-of-trade effects wash out between the two 
nations while the pollution increase reduces joint welfare.  This is explained below by adapting 
equation (25) to the current context: 
*
* * * * * *( ) ( ) .Wu G Gue du e du X X dp sdB s dB e e G dR           (33a) 
Note that market clearing for food requires that 0*  XX .  Thus, (33a) simplifies to 
 ** * * * *( ) .Wu G Gue du e du sdB s dB e e G dR           (33b) 
Evaluating (33b) at the nonintervention outcome ( 0*  ss ) , and normalizing marginal utility 
of income for both nations to unity at this outcome:  
* *
* 0( ) ( )
W
G Gs sd u u e e G dR      .       (34) 
It is clear that joint utility can rise only starting from nonintervention if global crude use falls, 
leading to less pollution.  Therefore, any policy intervention by either nation that leads to a net 
rise in crude use is jointly suboptimal.       
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Proposition 3:  If biofuel subsidy reduces global pollution, terms-of-trade considerations imply 
that: (i) the Nash policy for the food exporter is to use a biofuel subsidy; and, (ii) the Nash policy 
of the food importer is a biofuel tax iff the terms-of-trade motive dominates the pollution-
reduction motive.  Such a Nash equilibrium is jointly suboptimal, and may or may not dominate 
the free trade outcome. 
 
 The discussion preceding the proposition provides the proof.  It is clear from (34) that the 
Nash subsidy equilibrium may be associated with less pollution relative to free trade, which in 
turn implies that Nash intervention may dominate free trade.  On the other hand, a bad Nash 
equilibrium emerges when, for example, 0WsR  , * 0WsR  , and terms-of-trade motives dominate 
for both nations, so that home imposes a biofuel subsidy while foreign imposes a biofuel tax.  
Because 0WsR   and * 0WsR   in this case, the home subsidy and the foreign tax both raise 
pollution.  Clearly, in this case, the Nash equilibrium is worse than free trade.  The welfare 
ranking of other possible cases is not obvious, and one has to proceed on a case-by-case basis.     
 
4.  Conclusion 
 The main contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable general equilibrium analysis 
of biofuel subsides (in the tradition of a neoclassical competitive trade model) to provide 
guidance on optimal policies under certain constraints.  Accordingly, most of the policies 
analyzed are of the second-best variety.  In the first part of the paper we outline the role of 
opposing scale and substitution effects of biofuel subsidization, keeping in mind different 
general equilibrium linkages on both the consumption and production side.  Next, we extend the 
model to consider terms-of-trade considerations, and explore the link between the use of corn as 
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an input in producing energy and its demand as a final consumption good.  In this context, a 
combination of a tax on fossil fuel and a biofuel subsidy is shown to be optimal to target 
pollution and terms-of-trade.  Finally, we consider international interdependence in biofuel 
policy, and show that terms-of-trade considerations will amplify the biofuel subsidy of the food 
exporting nation, while it will moderate the level of this subsidy for the food importing nation.  
The effect of such Nash policies on global pollution (starting from a non-intervention outcome) 
is ambiguous.      
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Appendix 
A.  Terms-of-Trade Effects  
 For tractability, we assume quasi-linearity of preferences and separability of G for this 
appendix.  These assumptions allow us to abstract from income effects, considerably simplifying 
the discussion, without changing the thrust of our analysis.  The general case is available on 
request.  Using equations (27) and (28) from the text, it can be shown that 
s
s F
Npp
s D
   ,         (A1) 
where 0FD  , because of the Marshall-Lerner condition, and 
  (.)s s sFs pq q q sp p pN e C E f L q EC    .        (A2) 
Noting that the concavity of the unit cost function in sector M ensures that ( )w q [defined in 
footnote 24] is convex, we get   
   0Mq qq q
EE e E
q
     because 0qqe   and 
 2( )( ) 0
( )
M M
q F
w q
E L w q
pf L
    .   (A3) 
Also, 
( ) 0
( )
F
q F
w qL
pf L
   because ( ) 0
M
M
Ew q
L
      
 and (.) 0f   .    (A4) 
Finally, 
 ( , ,1) 0ss pq C p s r t q C       .       (A5) 
 Using (A3) through (A5) in (A2), and noting that (.)C is concave in input prices, 
  (.) 0s s sFs pq q q sp p pN e C E f L q EC      if  0pqe  .    (A6) 
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(A6) provides a sufficient but not necessary condition for the biofuel subsidy to raise the 
international price of food.  Indeed, even if pqe  is positive (i.e., food and energy are Hicksian 
substitutes in consumption), the price of food will rise unless this cross-substitution effect in 
consumption overwhelms all the other effects.   
 The primary effect of the subsidy is to raise the use of biofuel as an input into energy at 
given prices.  This is captured by the term 0s sp pEC  .  The subsidy also reduces the price of 
energy because of a reduction in the unit cost (i.e., 0sq  ).  The lower energy price directly 
raises food demand if they are Hicksian complements (i.e., if 0pqe  ).  It also boosts the demand 
for energy for consumption and as an input in manufacturing, thereby raising the demand for 
food as an input in energy production:   0s Mqq q spC e E q  .  Finally, the lower energy input 
price expands the manufacturing sector at the expense of the food sector, driving down food 
supply: 0Fqf L   because 0FqL  .  All these effects contribute to a rise in the net demand for 
food (unless pqe  is positive and larger than the sum of the other effects), raising the price of food.  
This confers a terms-of-trade benefit to the home country as the exporter of food, and a loss to 
the foreign country. 
 Similarly, 
t
t F
Npp
t D
   ,         (A7) 
where 
 (.)s s dFt pq q q tp p rN e C E f L q EC    ,        (A8) 
and 
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 (.) 0dt rq C  , 0s d s sp r p p
p sC C
r t
      .        (A9) 
Using equations (A3) to (A6), 
 (.) 0s Fpq q qpe C E f L    if 0pqe  .           (A10) 
Using (A9) and (A10) in (A8), we see that while the first term on the right-hand side of (A8) is 
negative, the second term is positive.  Thus the sign of tN  is ambiguous.  This happens for the 
following reasons.  First, the tax raises the relative price of crude as an input and increases the 
input demand for biofuel (and, therefore, for the food product) via the cross-substitution effect.  
On the other hand, the remaining effects all reduce demand for food as follows: (i) The crude tax 
raises the price of energy, which results in reduced consumption demand for food, if food and 
energy are Hicksian complements in consumption, (ii) The rise in the price of energy reduces the 
demand for energy, resulting in a decline in the derived demand for biofuel in energy production, 
(iii) Since 0FqL  , the rise in the energy price raises home’s supply of food, reducing the excess 
demand for food.  
 If, in the final analysis, the effects of the induced change in energy price are dominated 
by the primary cross-substitution effect, then 0 0t tN p   .  The analysis for *sp is similar to 
that for sp  above.   
 
B.   Effects of Policy Variables on Biofuel and Crude Use  
 Noting that ( , ,1)C p s r t   is the unit cost function in the energy sector, CRS ensures 
that 
 ( , ,1)spB EC p s r t   .         (A11) 
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Under quasi-linearity and separability in G, 
( , ) MqE e p q E  .         (A12) 
Noting that ( )w w q , using ( )M ME L w q  from (A4), and using (2) and (4) [which yields 
( , )M ML L p w ], we get  
 ( , ) , ( ) ( )M M ME E p q L p w q w q   ,       (A13) 
where ( ) 0M Mp pE w q L   , and 0MqE   as shown in (A3).  
 Allowing for all the policy variables considered in this paper to be present, the market 
clearing equation for food dictates that 
*( , , )p p s t s .          (A14) 
Using (A5), 
 ( , ,1) ( , , )q C p s r t q q p s t     ,         (A15) 
where 0sp pq C  ,   0ss ppq C q     , and 0dt rq C  .  Using (A12) through (A15), 
    *( , , ) (.), (.), , (.), (.), ,MqE E s t s e p q p s t E p q p s t         ,    (A16) 
where *(.) ( , , )p p s t s .  Using (A11) and (A16), 
 * *( , , ) ( , , ) ( (.) , ,1)spB s t s E s t s C p s r t   .       (A17) 
Using (A17) and simplifying, we get 
 ( ) ( ) (1 )s s s sM Ms qp p s s qq q sp p p pB C e E p C q e E EC p        .   (A18) 
In the small-country case 0sp   and (A18) reduces to 
 ( ) 0s s sMs s qq qp p pB C q e E EC    ,        (A19)  
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because 0sq   and 0MqE  from (A3) and because of concavity of the cost and expenditure 
functions. 
 Using (A18), it is clear that in the large-country case, if 1 0sp  , then 0sB   if the last 
term on the right-hand side of (A18) dominates or if 0qpe   and dominates the negative term 
M
pE .  Similarly, using (A17), 
  s s s d st t tp p p r pB E C p C C E   ,        (A20) 
where ( ) ( )( ) 0M Mt qp p t qq q p t tE e E p e E q p q      , if 0tp  and 0qpe  .  In the small-country 
case, 0tp   and (A20) boils down to 
 s d st tp r pB EC C E  , ( ) 0Mt qq q tE e E q   .       (A21) 
The two terms on the right hand side of the first equality in (A21) have opposite signs.  
Therefore, the sign of tB  is ambiguous even in the small-country case.  Using (A20) we can infer 
that the same is true in the large-country case.   
 Analogous to (A11), 
 ( , ,1)drR EC p s r t   .         (A22) 
Using (A16), we can differentiate (A22) to obtain: 
  d d s d dt t tr r p r rR C E E C p C   ,        (A23)  
where tE is defined in (A20) above.  In the small-country case, 
   ( ) 0d d d d d dMt t qq q tr r r r r rR C E EC C e E q EC      .        (A24) 
Using (A23) and (A20) we can see that there is ambiguity in the large-country case, but 0tR   if 
the term  0d s tr pC p   is sufficiently small and if 0qpe  .  Using (A22) and (A16), 
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 (1 )d d ss s sr r pR C E EC p   ,        (A25) 
where    M M Ms qp p qq q p s qq q sE e E e E q p e E q        .     
 In the small-country case, (A25) reduces to 
 d d sMs qq q sr r pR C e E q EC   .        (A26) 
Since   0d Mqq q srC e E q   and 0d sr pEC  , the sign of sR  is ambiguous even in the small-
country case. Finally, consider foreign crude use *.R   Analogous to (A22), and noting that 
* 0t  , 
 * * * *( , ,1)rR E C p s r  .         (A27) 
Like (A16), 
    ** * * * * * * * *( , , ) (.), (.), (.), (.),MqE E s t s e p q p s E p q p s         ,    (A28) 
where *(.) ( , , )p p s t s .  Thus, 
 * ** * * * * * * * * *( , ,1) s ss s r s r srp rpR E C p s r E C p Z C E C p     ,    (A29) 
where   * *s sE Z p ,  * * * ** * * * * *M Mp pq p q q qZ e E e E q     .     
 It is clear from (A29) that in the small-country case * 0sR  .  In the large-country case, 
the sign is ambiguous because * 0Z   if ** 0q pe  .  Similar derivations yield 
  ** * * * * st r trpR Z C E C p  .         (A30) 
* 0tR   in the small-country case, whereas its sign is ambiguous in the large-country case.   
 
 28
C.   Effect of Crude Price on Food and Manufacturing Output (under Laissez Faire) 
 Using the labor demand function in food defined following Eq. (2), and using Eq. (8) and 
footnote 24, we get 
   , , ,1F FL L p w C p r    .          (A31) 
Differentiating (A31), 
 F F F Fp w p r w rL L L w C p L w Cr     ;        (A32) 
where, r
pp
r
  , 0
F
pL  , 0FwL  , 0w  , 0pC  , and 0rC  .        
 In the small country case 0rp   and, hence, (A32) implies that 0
FL
r
  .  In this case, it 
is clear from Eq. (2) that food output must increase when the price of crude rises in the world 
market.  In the large country case, analysis along the lines of Section A above suggests that rp
can take either sign.  If it is positive, (A32) suggests that food output must rise.  If it is negative, 
the impact on food output is ambiguous. 
 Using Eq. (4) and the (A32): 
 0
M ML L
r r
      if 0rp  .          (A33) 
Using footnote 24, Eq. (8) and (A33), and noting that   0w q  [explained in Section A above]: 
   0M MM M M rE LE w q L w L w Cr r
             
if 0rp  .    (A34) 
Thus, in the small country case, ML  and ME must both fall as the price of crude rises and, 
therefore, manufacturing output falls.  In the large country case, as long as the rise in the crude 
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price raises the food price also, manufacturing output must fall.  If the food price falls, then the 
effect on manufacturing is ambiguous.  
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*Note that corn used for fuel ethanol in a given year comes from the previous year's crop. 
Source: Earth Policy Institute          
        
